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OUR ANCIENT AND SENSIBLE CONSTITUTION.
PROFESSOR CROSSKEY'S VIEW

E MERGING

from the obscurity which has gathered
around it during the years since 1789 and concealed its
real meaning, the Constitution stands revealed by Professor
Crosskey1 in its original clarity and vigor. This magnificent
accomplishment of legal scholarship is not to be dismissed as
just another book about the Constitution. If Professor Crosskey is wrong, he must be refuted. If he is right, it would seem
to be almost impossible to exaggerate the importance of his
work. Right or wrong, Professor Crosskey must now be
reckoned with by all who are concerned with constitutional
law, that is to say, everybody in the country, Congress, the
President, the Supreme Court, teachers, judges, lawyers, citizens. Perhaps it would not be too far wrong to say that there
is a grave moral responsibility imposed upon all those who
have sworn to uphold the Constitution to become familiar
with what Professor Crosskey has disclosed as to the meaning of that great instrument. Significantly, the book is dedicated "To the Congress of the United States in the hope
1
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that it may be led to claim and exercise for the common good
of the country the powers justly belonging to it under the
Constitution." 2
The real meaning of the Constitution, as expounded by
Professor Crosskey, is so radically different from the interpretations now current that at first sight it appears fantastic
and incredible. The author, of course, is aware of this fact,
and, no doubt, he fully expects to be roundly denounced and
abused by persons of various political views, for his book is
no party document and follows no party line. Denunciation,
however, will prove ineffective as an answer to the conclusions
announced by the author, because these conclusions are based
on evidence, an overwhelming mass of evidence, that the
industry and acumen of the author has assembled and presented for all to see and to weigh. In the preface to the two
stout volumes now published we are told that they: '
...are the first fruit of more than thirteen years' research into
the origins and intended character of the Government of the
United States and, likewise, into the many vicissitudes through
which that government has passed in the one hundred and
sixty-one years since its establishment.

The magnitude of the research involved in the preparation
of these first two volumes of the projected work is abundantly
manifest upon a first reading. Here the reader will find no
mere theoretical discussion of what was intended originally
by the words of the Constitution. For each clause, even for
each word, of the great instrument of government that has
been the subject of dispute, we are given documentary evidence as to the use of the words and phrases in question as
of the latter part of the eighteenth century in England and
America. The materials examined for the purpose of constructing a "dictionary" ' of eighteenth-century usage with
respect to important words used in the Constitution consist
2 CROSSxEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at v.
3 Id. at vii. The Preface is dated May 1, 1950. No explanation is given as to
the almost three-year delay in publication.
4

Id. at 5.
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not only of the writings of prominent men connected with the
drafting and ratification
of that document, but also many
"neutral" writings,5 some well-known, such as those of Blackstone, others unknown to fame, such as those of obscure
pamphleteers and letter-writers. Literally hundreds of pages
of text are devoted to determining the meaning as of 1787 of
the key words in the Commerce Clause, namely, "Commerce,"
"among," "States," and "regulate." All of these words conveyed a somewhat different meaning to the eighteenth-century American from what they convey to us today, but the
word in this series which has changed the most is "States."
We think of a "State" as a geographical unit, a certain territorial division. Such was not the primary eighteenth-century
notion at all. Where another sense was not specified its
ordinary meaning was "the people of a state." 6 Professor
Crosskey concludes that under the Constitution Congress has
full power to legislate with respect to economic affairs.7 He
points out the well-nigh intolerable evils which obtain at the
present time as a result of the pseudo-orthodox interpretation,
which concedes but a fragmentary power to Congress in such
matters." Restrictive conceptions of the commerce power
from Marshall's "commerce which concerns more States than
one" ' to the modern "interstate commerce" are fallacious
and should be abandoned. In his own words the author
states: "0
5 Id. at 5-6: "The samples of word-usage and juristic and political discussion,
of which [the dictionary] will be built, will, therefore, all be drawn, in the first
instance, from sources not connected with the Constitution. For, by using such
materials, a dictionary can be made which will not, it is conceived, be open to the
many natural suspicions that arise from the known or suspected political bias of
speakers and writers on the Constitution.",
6 Id. at 55 et seq.
T Id. at 292.
8 Id. at 20 et seq.
9 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194 (U.S. 1824), as quoted in CRossrEY, op.
cit. supra note 1, at 254: "This famous phrase which the Chief Justice coined,
though it has frequently been taken, in modern times, to signify our familiar 'interstate commerce' . . . but its meaning was much more extensive. It meant what it
literally said: all 'commerce' - that is, all 'commerce' of the internal, or domestic,
kind - 'which [is of interest, or importance, to] more states than one.'"
10 CRossnaEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 292.
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The laws of Congress in the commercial field could then be
complete. Jurisdictional litigation within that field could be
eliminated. Simple, uniform, nation-wide laws for the sale of
goods, and for the many other commercial matters for which
uniform law has so long been desired, could then be enacted.
A simple national companies act could replace the vast and
needless complexity that now comprises American corporation
law. And many other benefits would be possible. Since, then,
as we have seen, the one thing standing in the way of these
desirable results is the Supreme Court's belief that its own
long-held theories were established, not by itself, but by the
Commerce Clause; and since it is clear, on the basis of neutral,
unsuspect evidence of antecedent usage and political ideas,
and likewise on the basis of the understanding of the Commerce
Clause current in the early years, that the Supreme Court's
belief is unfounded, what good reason there can possibly be for
the country's any longer being deprived of the benefits that
would flow from the Court's confessing this fact, it is by no
means easy to see. And this being true, it would seem to follow
that the Court is in duty bound to take this step and thereby
get back, at least in its decisions under the Commerce Clause,
to the ancient and sensible document it is solemnly sworn to
uphold.

Four factors have contributed to bring about the present
misconceptions as to the meaning of the Constitution. One
of these has been indicated, namely, the changed meaning of
words. Another factor is a corresponding change in legal
conceptions. These two factors have reinforced "the many
attempts that have been made throughout our history to distort the Constitution to serve some political end." " The
fourth factor is "mere prolonged disuse, with the original
understandings of 1787 gradually becoming incredible as the
period of formation has receded into the mists of history." "2
The author takes these factors into account in his exposition
of the Commerce Clause and other important provisions of
the Constitution, which will be mentioned in this review.
Id. at 4.
12 Ibid. The operation of these factors are discussed again and again throughout
the book. See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional
Law, 42 HARv. L. REv. 365, 366 (1929): "Madison's warning . . . against 'those
errors which have their source in the changed meaning of words and phrases. . .. '
11
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Following his masterful treatment of the Commerce Clause,
three other sets of words are more briefly considered by the
author and shown to be related to the Commerce Clause. The
three matters in question are commonly known as the "Imports and Exports Clause," the "ExPost Facto Clause" (there
are actually two such clauses, one applicable to Congress, the
other to the states), and the "Contracts Clause." Readers who
are conversant with what is generally called "constitutional
law" will acknowledge that these provisions of the Constitution have been interpreted by the Supreme Court so as to have
minimal significance. They have been virtually destroyed. It
seems fairly obvious that they were originally intended to
have considerable significance. Professor Crosskey produces
abundant evidence that this surmise is correct.
The first of these clauses reads as follows: "
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be

absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws, and the
net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on
Imports and Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of
the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Controul of the Congress.
The author shows that for a proper understanding of this
clause the eighteenth-century American meaning of four
terms used therein must be determined. He establishes, again

by means of copious documentation, that to the eighteenthcentury American an "impost" was a tax required to be paid

with respect to goods brought in or taken out of a jurisdictional area, that is, the term was practically synonymous with
our modem term "duty" ' as in the expression "to pay the
duty on goods imported from France." On the other hand, to
the eighteenth-century American a "duty" was the equivalent
of our "excise," "5that is, it meant a tax levied not when
goods were brought in or taken out of a place, but after they
13 U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10, c. 2.
14 CROSSREY, Op. Cit. supra note 1, at 296.

15 Ibid.
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had "come to rest," such as an ad valorem levy on goods in a
warehouse. "Imports" and "exports" referred to the things
brought in or taken out of a place, such as a state or even a
town. These terms were not restricted to articles of merchandise transported to or from foreign countries." With
these meanings of the key terms in mind it is readily seen that
the Imports or Exports Clause was intended to have drastically restricted the taxing power of the states." This was the
clause that was to do away with the abuses every American
school child has heard about whereby New York, for example,
was able to and did prey upon her neighboring states. The
Supreme Court, however, has emasculated this provision so
that under present pseudo-orthodox theories of constitutional
law it is entirely ineffective for such purpose.'" Every lawyer
knows, or is supposed to know that imposts and duties are
the same thing and that imports and exports are goods coming from or being sent abroad. Something has to be done
about state taxation, however. Accordingly the Supreme
Court, as every lawyer knows, invokes the Commerce Clause
to control the taxing power of the states. Every lawyer knows,
or should know, what a mess has been made as a result of
this egregious error. The notorious confusion represented by
the cases dealing with the supposed limitation on the power
of the states with respect to taxation and other matters as a
result of some invisible radiation from the Commerce Clause
constitutes one of the most spectacular items of the stock in
trade of the writers and teachers concerned with taxation and
constitutional law. Professor Crosskey's analysis demonstrates the futility of much of the "learning" in this area. 9
16

Id. at 297.

17 Id. at 304: "And if this conclusion seems to cut down the revenue base of the
states too much to be credible, final judgment may be reserved, until it is seen more
fully, in the chapters to follow, just how restricted the role of the states was to be, in
the system of government the Constitution contemplated."
18

Id. at 315.

19 Id. at 321: "The Supreme Court's whole theory, it can thus be seen, is about
as plainly unfounded as a theory could be. It has nothing in logic to commend it
and, certainly, nothing in results."
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What is needed is a correct understanding of what the Constitution actually provides.
The provisions of the Constitution relating to ex post facto
laws read as follows: 20
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit
Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a
Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,
or grant any Title of Nobility.

The first of these applies to Congress. The second, which
by its terms applies to the states, also contains the Contracts
Clause, which is discussed below. Professor Crosskey shows
that to the eighteenth-century American an ex post facto law
meant any law having a retrospective effect." It was not
limited to laws respecting crimes as was stated by the Supreme Court in Calder v. Bull." The author sarcastically
characterizes this famous case as an act of judicial statesmanship,23 the sort of thing that is greatly admired by many
writers on constitutional law. If the prohibition of ex post
facto laws be given its natural meaning, that is, if the Constitution were observed, neither Congress nor the states could
pass retroactive laws. George Mason called attention to this
fact and opposed the adoption of the Constitution on that
ground, as indeed did many others. Mason, however, predicted that emergencies would arise when such a literal interpretation would appear too restrictive on legislative power
and then the words would be disregarded. That is exactly
what happened.24 The country was in the grip of a depression
in business affairs at the time of the decision in Calder v. Bull.
Robert Morris, known to every American schoolchild as the

22

§ 9, cr. 3; Id. at § 10, d. 1.
CRossnmY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 324 et seq.
3 Da1. 386 (U.S. 1798).

23
24

CROSSKEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 342 et seq.
Id. at 324-5.

20
21

U.S. Coxs'. Art. I,
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"financier of the Revolution," at one time considered among
the richest men in America, a "Founding Father," a former
senator, was unable to pay a comparatively small debt, and
was languishing in a debtors' prison.2 5 Many others were in
like circumstances, including James Wilson, another "Founding Father," Justice of the Supreme Court, who, however,
managed to escape the clutches of his creditors by fleeing
from Philadelphia, but who died in misery of spirit.2 6 Congress had not as yet enacted a bankruptcy law. If the ex post
facto language of the Constitution were observed, Congress
would not have the power to enact a bankruptcy law with
retroactive effect so as to provide relief for Morris, Wilson,
and many other highly respectable and deserving citizens.
Accordingly, Justices Chase, Iredell and Paterson managed
to torpedo the ex post facto language. The alleged reasons
for their action, swallowed whole by learned men ever since,
are shown by Professor Crosskey to be spurious. Here is a fine
beginning for judicial statesmanship. Two years later, in
1800, Congress passed a bankruptcy law with retroactive
effect. For practical purposes the ex post facto prohibitions
of the Constitution have been dead letters ever since."
The Contracts Clause has not fared much better at the
hands of the Supreme Court. If this provision were interpreted literally, as Professor Crosskey shows it was meant to
be, no state could cut down the period of limitation with
respect to the bringing of actions on a contract, nor could it,
for example, increase the application of the Statute of Frauds.
In fact, under the Constitution the states are practically
powerless to decrease the obligation of any contract.2 8 The
interpretation sanctified in Ogden v. Saunders 29 is an exId. at 348.
Id. at 349.
27 Id. at 351: "The 'error' of the case has, nevertheless, persisted; and the Expost-facto Clauses, at the present day, are completely meaningless, except for a
purpose for which they were hardly needed."
28 Id. at 354.
29 12 Wheat. 213 (U.S. 1827).
25

26
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ample of "juristic metaphysics." " Professor Crosskey shows
the absurdity of this interpretation (which, it will be recalled,
restricts the prohibition to the impairment of obligations of
contracts already in existence) by an appeal to ordinary
English usage - both that of the eighteenth century and
that of today. The plain meaning of words has been distorted
by the Court. The bearing of all this discussion on the Commerce power of Congress should now emerge. Congress is not
prohibited by the Constitution to impair the obligation of
contracts. Indeed, under the Commerce power it has a positive grant to do so. The states were not to meddle in such
31
affairs.
The reader of the preceding woefully inadequate summary
of Professor Crosskey's exposition of the Commerce power
and related matters should go to the text itself to appreciate
the compelling documentation for the positions taken there.
Perhaps even more impressive than the documentation, however, are Professor Crosskey's magisterial and truly lawyerlike analyses of the materials and his bringing them together
so that they have a cumulative effect on the reader. He shows
again and again how his interpretation of one clause confirms his interpretation of another. He brings out the consistency of the Constitution in all its parts, provided it be
read aright. It is hoped that this consistency of meaning will
become more apparent after a consideration is given to the
other provisions of the Constitution covered by Professor
Crosskey in these first two volumes of his great work.
The examination of the Commerce power of Congress and
related matters previously discussed is but the first movement
CaossimY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 353.
Id. at 359-360: "As originally drawn, and as the clause still reads, there can
be no doubt whatever that it has the meaning set forth in these pages. That meaning was intended. State power over contracts was deliberately voted down. And that
means that a national intrastate commerce power, and as well, of course, full commercial power in other fields, must have been intended to exist. In short, it is
oblique internal evidence of a most cogent kind that the view here taken of the
national commerce power, in the earlier pages of this book, is correct."
30

31
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of the great symphony, which continues with a profound discourse on the national governing powers. For comprehension
of what the Constitution actually provides in this regard it is
necessary to have some knowledge of eighteenth-century
canons of interpretation and methods of draftsmanship. The
canons of interpretation from Plowden to Blackstone are
carefully considered and their application to the Constitution
as a whole are shown." Only the most striking results can be
related here. Perhaps the most arresting of these is the enhanced importance the eighteenth-century rules give to the
Preamble." Another is the proper construction to be given
general language which is succeeded in a writing by an enumeration of particular matters included in the general language.
This scheme is, of course, exemplified in the first three articles
of the Constitution. The author points out that the Supreme
Court has applied the eighteenth-century rules to Article II
and Article III, but has refused to do so with respect to Article
V' in spite of the fact that Article I contains what was known
in the eighteenth century as the "sweeping clause," which
reads as follows: '5
[The Congress shall have Power] To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-

tion in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. [Emphasis supplied.]
32 Id. at 363 et seq. Chapter XIII is entitled: "The Scheme of Draftsmanship of
the Constitution, in the Light of the Accepted Rules of Interpretation of the
Eighteenth Century."
33 Id. at 370: "The Preamble-Fisher Ames, Elias Boudinot, and John Lawrence,
all insisted-was an important and operative part of the document; and on the
basis of the purposes of the Government therein recited, Congress-in the words of
Ames, with which the others agreed-had 'authority over all objects of national
concern,' or importance." Today the importance of the Preamble and preambles in
general is minimized. In fact the celebrated Roscoe Pound has expressed a hostile
attitude towards preambles. See Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty, 20 NOTRE DAmi LAW. 183, 214 (1945). His attitude is probably
representative of that of many others in the legal profession.
34 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), with respect to the executive
power, and Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), with respect to fLe judicial
power.
35 U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, c. 18.
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The Constitution rightly understood makes clear that Congress has all the legislative power granted therein rather than
only the legislative power granted therein. These logically
tautological expressions are of quite different meaning as a
matter of emphasis.3 6 It should be noted that the Constitution
uses all not only. These considerations become important for
an understanding of the true meaning of the first clause of
Article I, Section 8:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ....

We have all been taught to believe that this clause provides
only for a taxing and spending power but not for a substantive power to provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the country. According to Professor Crosskey, this
traditional view is clearly erroneous. He takes many pages to
show why this is so and why the correct view is that there
can be no reasonable doubt that the clause was, in fact,
intended in its substantive sense."r He ably refutes the stock
arguments against such an interpretation. The punctuation
argument he dismisses rather summarily, as it, no doubt,
36 Caossx.y, op. cit. supra note 1, at 390: "That the Supreme Court's mistaking
the 'spirit' and 'intention' of the introductory words of the article on Congress was
not, by any means, an inconsequential thing is further indicated by its having
blinded the Court completely, in Kansas v. Colorado, to the 'literal' meaning of the
last paragraph of the eighth section of that article; the provision, that is, which
sweeps into the possession of Congress, in the dearest terms, all the national lawmaking' powers; and this, whether those powers are 'mentioned and defined' in the
article on Congress, or not. The Court's mistake about the 'spirit' and 'intention' of
the Legislative Article-first made, of course, long before this case of 1906-has also
had many other most unfortunate results. For the mistaken belief in a jealous, chary
grant of legislative power has undoubtedly been a factor, and an important factor,
in the failure of the Court, and the profession generally, to perceive the plain meaning of the various specific grants of Congressional power; such grants, for example,
as that of the power 'to regulate Commerce among the several States'; the power to
legislate generally in that troublesome field, the conflict of laws; and the power,
broad and important, which Congress undoubtedly has, to regulate the constitutions
of our several states, to the end of keeping those local and subordinate governments
really republican in character."
37 Id. at 401.
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merits little consideration.38 Nevertheless he considers it and
answers it. The enumeration argument and the position
argument require very extended consideration. An elaborate
study of the enumerated powers has been undertaken, the
upshot of which may be briefly summarized as follows: "
Many of these powers appeared as powers of Congress under
the Articles of Confederation. These were repeated in the
new instrument of government out of an abundance of caution. Every lawyer will recognize the reasonableness of this
procedure. But more important for a correct understanding
of the Constitution are other enumerated powers, which,
under eighteenth-century notions, were traditionally considered as executive powers. Professor Crosskey makes the
point that the framers of the Constitution were particularly
anxious to see to it that the President under the new Constitution would not be in a position to claim the prerogative
powers of the British King. They saw to it that many of the
traditional executive powers as set forth in Blackstone's
Commentaries were to be in the hands of Congress and not
the President. Their concern was not with what powers Congress should have as against the states. Again and again the
author emphasizes this important fact. The enumerated
powers of Congress that are not accounted for by reason of
the foregoing considerations are explained as being stated
for the purpose of providing a limitation on what would
otherwise be an unlimited power. As for the position of the
Common Defense and General Welfare clauses in the middle
of the provisions respecting taxes there is also extended discussion. The well-known importance of the taxing power to
the new government seems to be the principal reason for its
position at the head of the list. Professor Crosskey also emphasises the peculiar character of the taxing power in the
minds of eighteenth-century Americans. He also disposes of
38

Id. at 394.

39 The sketchy summary which follows is an attempted condensation of two
long chapters: Chapters XV and XVI.
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the position of the proviso at the end of the first paragraph of
Article I, Section 8 as a not unusual phenomenon of eighteenth-century draftsmanship.
After explaining in detail what the general legislative
power of Congress under the Constitution is, as contrasted
with the distorted views that have come to be traditional,
the author takes up the judiciary article. Again he presents
a wealth of eighteenth-century background material which is
necessary for grasping what is really set forth in the Constitution with respect to the judicial power of the United
States.4 Here the reader.will find an excellent account of the
jurisprudential ideas of the enghteenth-century. Natural Law
and the law of nations, of course, require consideration. This
background material and the discussion of the judiciary article in the latter part of the first volume42 are of special
interest to the legal profession. At the time of the drafting
of the Constitution and for a considerable period thereafter
the general notion was that the common law was really a
common law. Our modern American idea that each state in
the union has its own common law was unknown. This modern
notion would never have become the accepted view if the
Constitution were enforced as it is written. The courts of the
United States, particularly the Supreme Court, would see to
it that justice be established throughout the length and
breadth of the land according to one national system. That
this result was intended is made abundantly clear by the
author in this portion of the book. The broad and sweeping
40 See Chapter XVII, entitled "The Totality of Congressional Authority as Here
Presented, and as Generally Conceived."
41 See Chapter XVIII, entitled "Eighteenth-Century 'General Jurisprudence'
and 'the Common Law'."
42 See Chapters XIX, XX and XXI, entitled, respectively, "'The Common Law'
and the Administration of justice in Eighteenth-Century America"; "The National
Judicial Powers under an Eighteenth-Century Interpretation: Herein of the Supreme Court's Judicial Supremacy and the Common-Law Jurisdiction of the Courts
of the United States"; "The National Judicial Powers under an Eighteenth-Century
Interpretation: Herein of These Powers with the Second Category of 'Cases'
Minimally Taken."
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judicial power parallels and confirms his interpretation of the
general legislative power of Congress.
The first volume concludes with an analysis of the Tenth
Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 3
This discussion is necessary at this particular point in the
book, which deals with the general powers of the national
government, because, as every schoolchild knows, the Tenth
Amendment is everlastingly invoked by States' Rights propagandists as a limitation on the powers of the national government. As the author himself says: "
... this amendment is nowadays generally supposed to make
impossible the existence of general national legislative authority
in Congress, and general judicial power in the courts of the
United States.
Again the meaning of key words has to be established. The
two words which require special study are "delegated" and
"reserved." The first had a meaning in the eighteenth century
which is now obsolete, namely, to "alienate" or "convey."
Professor Crosskey shows how it was used by Blackstone in
comparable contexts.4 5 "Reserved" had the same legal meaning in the eighteenth century that it has today." A reserved
power or privilege comes into existence at the time of a grant.
Another important part of the language used in the amendment is at the end, where the punctuation, according to
eighteenth-century practice, shows that "to the people" is in
apposition with "to the States." Again "States" means the
people, not the local legislatures.47 What then is the meaning
43 U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. X. See Chapter XXII, entitled "The Tenth Amendment
and the National Powers."
44 CROSSXEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 675.
45 Id. at 698 et seq.
46 Id. at 701 et seq.
47 Id. at 705-6: "'The States respectively' and 'the people,' in the Tenth Amendment, do not, therefore, signify different persons, as has sometimes been supposed;
they signify the same persons; and the persons they signify are 'the People of the
United States' respectively, of the general granting clause in the Preamble. The
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of the amendment? It is simply declaratory of existing law.
That it was so understood in Congress and out at the time of
its adoption is established by the evidence Professor Crosskey
brings forward. He concludes his treatment of the Tenth
Amendment as follows: 48
Merely on the basis of contemporaneous usage, the interpretation here suggested is, therefore, a reasonable interpretation; and there are, as we have seen, many corroboratory
considerations. Thus, it is the only interpretation that accounts
for the shift from "retains," in the Articles, to "reserved," in
the Tenth Amendment. It is the only interpretation consistent
with the pointedly complete omission from the amendment,
of any statement about state "sovereignty," such as the antecedent analogous provision of the Articles contained; and it
is the only one consistent with the sweeping provision for
national sovereignty, or "supremacy," which is found in
Article VI of the Constitution. .. .In short, it is a meaning
of the Tenth Amendment which completely fits its words and
all the other known facts; and the virtual certainty would seem
to be that it is what the Tenth Amendment was drawn, and
originally understood, to mean. And this being true, it is clear
the amendment in no way impugns theconclusions previously
reached, as to the generality of the powers of Congress, and of
those of our national courts, under the Constitution. Instead,
the amendment confirms them.

The regular textual portion of the second volume relates
mainly to the function of the Supreme Court under the Constitution as contrasted with its role in history. The author
again puts before the reader cogent evidence that at the
beginning of our history under the Constitution there was
meaning of the amendment is not, then, that a 'reservation' of powers is made
either 'to the States respectively or to the people,' understanding 'the States respectively' and 'the people,' in divergent senses. The Tenth Amendment is not
punctuated to convey such a thought, and the word 'either' is not one the amendment contains. An indeterminate, alternative 'reservation' of this kind would, moreover, be essentially meaningless; for there would be no way, under such a 'reservation,' to tell what is 'reserved,' by 'the supreme Law,' to whom. This consideration,
in itself, seems enough to condemn the usual view, and enough to make clear that the
'reservation' was made 'to the States respectively'; that is to say, 'to the people.'
The two phrases, in short, were used in opposition in the amendment and are so
punctuated in it. This view, it will be perceived, reduces everything to order; it
accords with the shift from 'retains' to 'reserved'; and there can be no reasonable
doubt it is what was intended."
48 Id. at 708.
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general recognition of the Supreme Court as really being the
supreme court, that is, the juridical head of the nation." In
this connection the author provides an elaborate study of the
background of the case of Huidekoper'sLessee v. Douglass."
He states: 51
It involved the meaning of a statute the Pennsylvania legislature had passed, on the 3d of April, 1792, "for the sale of
the [state's] vacant lands"; particularly, those "lying north
and west of the rivers Ohio and Allegheny, and Conewango
creek," in the general northwest area of the state, sometimes
called "the West Allegheny," of which the town of Meadville
later became the center. This statute had been interpreted
earlier by the Pennsylvania courts, in a manner contrary to
that in which the United States Supreme Court interpreted it;
and since no Constitutional limitation was involved in the case,
other than those implied in the Supreme Court's supreme
juridical position, it can be seen at once that the question of the
Court's judicial supremacy was presented in the case, in circumstances which, most lawyers would probably agree, were
of the kind least favorable to its recognition.

Professor Crosskey subsequently takes up the theme of the
attacks on the national judiciary by the Jeffersonians." His
account of the Alien and Sedition laws, midnight judges and
the rest, is quite different from what is usually told today.53
A culmination of the Jeffersonian assault as regards constitutional law was the decision in the Hudson and Goodwin
case,54 which receives thorough treatment by the author. This
case established "the great and destructive principle" " that
there is no national common law of crimes. A number of other
famous early cases have new light shed upon them in this
part of the book, but for the sake of brevity, only the last of
the series will be mentioned here. This is the case of Green
49 See Chapter XXIII, entitled "The Initial Recognition of the Supreme Court's
Position as the Nation's Juridical Head."
50 3 Cranch i (U.S. 1805).
5i CROSSKEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 719.
52 Id. at 754.

53

Id. at 760.

54

United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32 (U.S. 1812).
CROSSKFY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 783.
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v. Lessee of Neal,56 wherein "the Court, in 1832, deliberately
abdicated its Constitutionally conferred powers with respect
to all state written law whatsoever." "
All lawyers, whatever their special interests may be, will
find Chapters XXV and XXVI of the book close to their
hearts. They recount the history of "The Supreme Court's
Loss of Supremacy with Respect to State Law and Common
Law: Herein of the Rise of the Theory of Two Independent
Judiciaries without a Common Head" and "of the Subordination of the National Courts to the State Judiciaries." Here
is a long but fascinating (as well as tragic) story, impossible
to summarize in a few words. Some of it is familiar, but Professor Crosskey's account is refreshingly different in many
respects from what has been presented by others. The most
important episode must be mentioned. This is the decision of
the Supreme Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.5" The historical background of this famous decision is, of course, thoroughly explored, and the author pays his respects to John
Chipman Gray,59 Justice Holmes,6" and others in the course
56 6 Pet. 291 (U.S. 1832).
57 CROSSXEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 816.
58 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
59 CROSSxEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 904-5: "But, at last, in 1909, the late John
Chipman Gray, a professor in the Harvard Law School, well known as an expert
on certain narrow and esoteric branches of property law, published a book entitled
The Nature and Sources of the Law. In it, he took issue with what he described as
the out-of-date, eighteenth-century, Blackstonian theory, that a judicial decision
considered as a precedent, is evidence of what the law is, but not itself the law; he
attacked, too, the view of a contemporary American writer, that judges, in deciding
cases, merely discover the law; and he presented, instead, as the only correct view,
the theory that the judges make the law, both statutory and non-statutory, by their
decisions; that they make the non-statutory law by their decisions as to what the
Common Law is, and the statutory law by their decision as to what the acts of their
legislature mean. And since 'the laws of the several states,' both written and unwritten, were made-so he insisted-and, in the nature of the case (as he conceived
it), could only be made, by the courts of the states, the Supreme Court of the United
States was guilty, he thought, of a very obvious and regrettable error in not following, and in not compelling the lower national courts to follow, the decisions of the
state courts, as absolutely binding precedents on all points of Common Law and
state statutory law, that came before them.... The contrary practice of the national
courts-by no means wholly consistent, by 1909-he ascribed 'chiefly,' and very
strangely, to the malign agency of a single judge, a judge long since dead, of whom
he very evidently did not approve: Justice Joseph Story, who had written the
Court's famous opinion in Swift v. Tyson, in 1842. For Professor Gray, very ob-
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of his account. As for the decision itself the author has a
great deal to say. Let the following suffice for the moment:
So, had Justice Brandeis, in the Erie case, only taken the
trouble to read the Constitution, or even the opinion of his
great predecessor, in Martin v. Hunter, he would have undoubtedly have been saved from the grievous error he committed. But like Justice Holmes before him, he felt a high
certitude about the Constitution and did not take this trouble;
and the Supreme Court, in consequence, took the final step in
its strange declension from its plainly granted position as the
supreme and general juridical head of the country.
And since the new rule of decision adopted by the Court was
one totally irreconcilable with its own Constitutional position
as the nation's general juridical head, the decision stands revealed, both in its manner and in its substance, as one of the
most grossly unconstitutional governmental acts in the nation's
entire history. How many millions of dollars, in money and
other property, are now inhands other than they would have
been, had the Court's unwarranted decision not been made, it
is utterly impossible to say. But it is perfectly safe to say that
the total must be enormous.

Next comes a discussion of the historical background of
judicial review 2 and "Judicial Review in the Constitution." "'
Professor Crosskey's conclusion as to what the Constitution
provides with respect to this matter is as follows: "
So, taking into account all the several kinds of evidence thus
far examined, the situation seems very clear: judicial review
viously without any real knowledge of the subject on which he had assumed to
speak, apparently imagined that Justice Story had originated the practice to which
he objected, and originated it in the case in question.
"The utter folly of such a view will be apparent to all who read this book;
but even in the absence of knowledge of the true genealogy of Swift v. Tyson, the
superficial character of the views expressed in The Nature and Sources of the Law
would seem to have been pretty obvious."
60 Id. at 907: "And to the document [the Constitution] that was the test of
certainty on the matters upon which he spoke, Justice Holmes, like the 'accomplished and able writer' he admired, paid no attention at all. Instead, he relied upon

books, and theories of his own, as to 'the nature and sources of the law,' and, in
consequence, sowed the first seed, in 1910, of the most colossal error the Supreme
Court has ever made."
61 Id. at 915, 916.
62 Id. at 938.
63 Id. at 976.
64 Id. at 1007.
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was not meant to be provided generally in the Constitution, as
to acts of Congress, though it was meant to be provided
generally as to the acts of the states, and a limited right likewise was intended to be given to the Court, even as against
Congress, to preserve its own judiciary prerogatives intact.

This conclusion is reached after a careful analysis of the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution. In this connection,
the author's interpretation of the Supremacy Clause6 5 is a
real shocker. The crucial words are "which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof." We have all been taught what those words
are supposed to mean, but the real meaning is quite different
from that. The "simple, straightforward view" "6 of the
Supremacy Clause is that the Constitution itself, acts of Congress made in pursuance of the Constitution - not some
other constitution, as, for example, the old Articles of Confederation - and treaties made under the authority of the
United States - that is to say, including treaties made before
the adoption of the new Constitution - are to be the supreme
law of the land: the old common law rules, almost universally
recognized as "laws of the United States" in the eighteenth
century, are not to be part of the supreme law. "In Pursuance
thereof," in short, does not mean "in accordance with" as we
have been taught to believe, but rather "in consequence or
prosecution of," the usual meaning of the phrase in the
eighteenth century.67 The Supremacy Clause, which has been
called the "heart of the Constitution," as indeed it is, reads
as follows: 68
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,

shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
65 U.S. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 2.
66 CROSSKEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1000.
67 Id. at 991.
68 U.S. CoNsT. Art. VI, § 2.
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In view of the plain meaning of this emphatic provision it
seems farcical that any petty state judge, even a justice of the
peace, should think that he had the right and the power to
declare an act of the Congress of the United States unconstitutional. Yet so it has been - often with the enthusiastic
approval of many members of the legal profession. "9
The last major portion of the text deals with the FourThe most important conclusion set
teenth Amendment.
forth by the author in this area is that Justice Harlan7 was
right about the Fourteenth Amendment and that the Supreme
Court and certain scholars are wrong; 72 in other words, the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment does indeed incorporate the Bill of Rights. This portion of the book is
probably of greater general interest than any other part, but
this review will not attempt to give further details. Every
69 Judicial review is further discussed in Chapter XXIX, entitled "Judicial Review in the Federal Convention and the First Congress: Herein, also, of Marbury v.
Madison."
70 See Chapters XXXI and XXXII, entitled, respectively, "The True Meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment" and "The Supreme Court's Transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment." The author states, in a footnote, CROSSicaY, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 1083 n: "The matters dealt with in this and the following chapter are
very simple and very obvious. Nevertheless, they are matters which still divide
sharply the Justices of our highest court, as may readily be seen by reference to the
recent case of Adamson v. California,332 U.S. 46 (1947). And this being seen, the
reasons for all the detailed explanation and analysis in this and the following chapter will no doubt be understandable to any reader who might otherwise wonder why
such simple subjects are treated herein at such great length."
7'
See Justice Harlan's dissenting opinions in the Civil Rights Case, 109 U.S. 3,
26 (1883); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908).
72 The notes contain many strictures on judges and scholars. The last note on
page 1381 is given as an example, CRossICEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1381 n. 11:
"Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STANFORD LAW REviEW, 5 (1949); see, also, Morrison,
The Judicial Interpretation, ibid, 140. Entirely apart from questions of the adequacy, and of the handling, of the evidence which Mr. Fairman presents, it is to be
remembered that a recurrence to evidence which of the sort he presents, is illegitimate in the case of a provision, like the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which is clear in itself, or clear when read in the light of the prior law. It is doubly
illegitimate when it is remembered that most of what the first section of that
amendment requires, was also required by Amendments II-VIII. Cf., discussion
herein in chapters xxx and xxxi. Mr. Fairman apparently forgets that the ultimate
question is not what the legislatures meant, any more than it is what Congress or
the more immediate framers of the amendment meant: it is what the amendment
means. Cf., Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HLR, 417 (1899)."
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reader of these lines is urged to go to the book itself at the
earliest opportunity.
There are several appendices, in which a number of documents are reproduced, including the Articles of Confederation
and the Constitution. One very interesting document is the
letter of the President of the Federal Convention (George
Washington), dated September 17, 1787, to the President
of the Congress, transmitting the Constitution, in which the
following statement is made: "
In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in
our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of

every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which
is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national

existence.

It seems quite evident that Washington did not think that
States' Rights was the greatest interest of every true American!
The second volume also contains the notes to the text of
both volumes as well as a good index.
II
No attempt has been made to conceal the present reviewer's enthusiasm for Professor Crosskey's work. On the basis
of what has already been published it seems that Professor
Crosskey's view of the Constitution is the correct one, but it
should be remembered that the first two volumes are a mere
fraction of the projected work, and it seems safe to assume
that the succeeding volumes will confirm what has already
been said. The author does not state how many more volumes
will be necessary to set forth what he has to say about politics
and the Constitution in the history of the United States, but
he surely contemplates producing more than two or three
additional volumes if he continues to canvass the materials
in the thorough fashion of the first two volumes. While there
73

CROSSKEY,

op. cit. supra note 1, at 1234.
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are numerous excursions and disgressions in the present set
that take the reader up to present-day events, on the whole,
these first two volumes present primarily those materials that
show what the Constitution by its very language said and was
intended to say to the people of the United States when it
was first brought forward for their consideration and adoption. Again and again the author indicates that his discussion
of what was said and done in the Federal Convention and
what happened in the ratification campaign will appear in
subsequent volumes. Many volumes, it would seem, will be
required for consideration of the fateful politics of the preCivil War years, Lincoln's administration and the reconstruction era. Then, many more will be required to bring the story
down to date. It is a stupendous task, which it is hoped the
author will be spared to complete. Whether or not the work
is ever completed, however - indeed, in a sense it never can
be - the work as it stands today is the prime work on the
Constitution, superseding all others. Whatever has been
written or said about the Constitution must now be reexamined and revised to see how well or how ill it accords with
what Professor Crosskey has written. Most of what has been
said or written in the past is, to say the least, very misleading.
No course in constitutional law in the future will be sound
without abundant references to Professor Crosskey.
Of course, it would be unrealistic to expect that the teaching of constitutional law, let alone the practice thereof by the
legal profession or expounding thereof by the Supreme Court,
will be transformed overnight because of the appearance of
any book, however sound and true it may be. Truth is great
and will prevail, but when? Two thousand years have not
been enough for Truth Itself. One cannot, then, be very
sanguine about our poor mundane truths. In fact, if Professor Crosskey's book receives one-tenth of the attention
which it deserves, it will stir up some very unholy opposition.
His severe strictures respecting men in opposing camps as
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regards interpretation of the Constitution will antagonize
many. He roundly condemns American legal scholarship in
the field of constitutional law. 4 He is at odds with the historians. He does not spare the reputations of many revered
jurists. Perhaps unintentionally he will antagonize some
groups,75 but he is certainly prepared for the onslaughts of
the States' Rights contingent that we seem to have always
with us. He throws down the gage to that group in the following language: "
The stock argument is that preservation of "States' Rights"
to regulate intrastate commerce, and also to do many other
things, is necessary for the preservation of American liberty.
The connection between "States' Rights" and American liberty
is, however, never explained. And the truth is that "States'
Rights" have never, at any time in our history, stood for
liberty. Instead, in the beginning, when the Constitution was
drawn, "States' Rights" stood for the "vested rights" of a small
and vociferous group of local politicians who had crept into
power in certain of the states while Washington and thousands
of other men had been in the army fighting for American
liberty. "States' Rights" also stood, at that early day, for the
"vested rights" of New York and certain of our other states to
collect their governmental expenses, in the form of a customs
impost, from their neighbors; and they stood at that time, or
a little earlier, for the "vested rights," principally of certain
of our Southern states, to land claims absorbing virtually the
entire western country, which had been obtained from Great
74 Id. at 1170, where the author makes the following interesting observation:
"For, with the actual provisions of the Constitution, and the pressure of politics,
in coincidence, the normal expectation would surely be that the Court's theories
would tend gradually to shift back to a rational congruence with the document it is
sworn to uphold.
"That this has not occurred is undoubtedly to be explained by the poverty of
scholarship in the field, and the consequent miseducation that Americans, and
particularly lawyers, have long received in the subject. Thus, of all the misconstructions notified in the foregoing pages, only those relating to the Fourteenth Amendment, and not always all of these, are commonly recognized and treated, in the
conventional scholarly literature on constitutional law."
75 This reviewer wishes that Professor Crosskey had used a more accurate expression on pages 145 and 478 than "Romish" cergy or church. On the latter page
he seems to betray an unfortunate anti-Catholic bias, particularly where he states:
"when, fortunately for England, Mary died, in 1558, it therefore became possible for
her successor, Elizabeth, to confirm the incorporation and yet turn it to the support
of the English, rather than the Romish, church." No Catholic can read such lines
without a feeling of sadness.
76
CRossXEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 47-8.
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Britain, in consequence of the exertions of all the states, by the
peace of 1783. At that time, few Americans were so naive as to
believe that "States' Rights" stood for liberty. And so, the
Federal Convention went directly to the people when it sought,
by the Constitution, in very large measure to abolish "States'
Rights." At that time, too; [sic] and still more, a little later;
[sic] and from then on, down to the Civil War, "States'
Rights" stood for the right of a small minority of the people
of our Southern states to continue the institution of human
slavery. And after the Civil War, "States' Rights" came gradually to stand for lawlessness in business. For, by an adroit
playing-off of "States' Rights" against the nation, and national
rights against the states, both state and national regulations of
business could, as a practical matter, largely be evaded; and
practices became possible in the American business world,
which never ouglit to have been tolerated and would, presumably, not have been tolerated, but for the Supreme Court's
paralyzing theories of the Constitution.
The issue, then, in the controversy over "States' Rights"
and the national commerce power is not an issue of liberty. It
is an issue solely of effective government. It is whether we shall
have in this country, over the affairs of commerce, a government able to bring to a point the considered sentiments of the
American people; to formulate policies on the basis of such
sentiments; and to try out the policies so formulated with a
minimum of expense, and a minimum of delay, in such a way
as to determine whether the policies work and should be retained, or do not work and should be discarded in favor of
something better.

It will be very interesting to watch the reactions from
various quarters to this book. Ridicule will no doubt be heaped upon the author and those who will agree with him. In the
present era of the Great Repression, as Professor John P.
Frank calls it, one may expect much worse.
Despite all hostile clamor, however, it really seems inconceivable that this great book will not have very soon a
tremendous impact on the constitutional development of the
United States. Inevitably, it would seem, someone will cite
this work in a brief before the Supreme Court. Soon, let us
hope, the members of the Supreme Court will all have read
the work themselves. Perhaps some, or all, of them will be
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convinced of the accuracy of what Professor Crosskey has
to say. Perhaps members of Congress will also read and be
converted. Conversion will be hard for those who have been
vociferous of late about what they call constitutional government. Professor Crosskey demonstrates that they just do not
know what they are talking about.
III
So many of us have been taught or have come to accept
the dogma that the Constitution is what the judges say it is,
that it is difficult to get back to what is undoubtedly the
correct view, namely, that the Constitution is what it says
it is. That is the great fundamental teaching of the first two
volumes of Professor Crosskey's book. It is the Constitution
that the judges and others are sworn to uphold, not what the
Supreme Court says, or what Professor Crosskey says either.
To make his point as telling as possible the author quotes at
the beginning of each volume a wise saying of Justice
Holmes: "We ask, not what this man meant, but what those
words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of
English, using them in the circumstances in which they were
used."
This saying succinctly summarizes the method of the two
volumes. From them the reader may learn not what Madison
meant but what the actual words of the Constitution meant
to the people of the United States when they ordained and
established the Constitution.
The author points out that even today this sound approach
to the Constitution is occasionally recognized in high places.
Justice Frankfurter, for example, has said that on important
issues of constitutional law the Constitution is, and must be,
"the ultimate touchstone." " In a recent famous case, Zorach
v. Clauson," Judge Desmond of the New York Court of
77
78

tiraves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939).
503 N.Y. 161, 100 N.E.(2d) 463 (1951).
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Appeals, concurring, had occasion to remark that the constitutional provision invoked by the petitioner, the First
Amendment, was not quoted in his brief and the judge stated
that the amendment was one "lavishly alluded to but seldom
quoted." " The same might be said for many other provisions of the Constitution, particularly those that have been
quoted in this review. It is hoped that the judicial movement
of succeeding years will be one "back to the Constitution."
There can be little doubt that such a movement would redound to the general welfare of the people of the United
States.
Roger PaulPeters*

79 Id., 100 N.E.(2d) at 470.
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